The cost, and the closely related length of time, spent in searching for mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO) may well be largely determined by the number of false alarms. False alarms result in time consuming digging of soil or in additional multisensory tests in the minefield. In this paper we consider two area based methods for reducing false alarms. These are (a) the previously known "declaration" technique,8"° and (b) the new 5-Technique which we introduce. We first derive expressions and lower bounds for false alarm probabilities as a function of declaration area, and discuss their impact on receiver operation characteristic (ROC) curves. Secondly we exploit characteristics of the statistical distribution of sensory energy in the immediate neighborhood of targets and of false alarms from available calibrated data, to propose the ö-Technique which significantly improves discrimination between targets and false alarms. The results are abundantly illustrated with statistical data and ROC curves using Electromagnetic Induction Sensor data made available through DARPA8 from measurements at various calibrated sites.
INTRODUCTION
Automatic mine detection and the detection of unexploded ordnance have become a subject of great importance, and a variety of sensors and processing systems have recently been proposed for mine remediation. A number of novel technical approaches to this major problem have been recently emerged based on a variety of sensor technologies9"115 and the field is now on the verge of significant scientific and technical development. All approaches are based on the on-line or off-line algorithmic processing of data from single or multiple sensors, and on data fusion techniques that can take advantage of the complementary characteristics of different sensors. In this framework, availability of multisensory data8 from calibrated minefields, and from minefields which offer significant challenge to detection algorithms, are particularly useful.
In remedial mine detection, which is primarily directed to an exhaustive removal of mines for humanitarian purposes, both the probability of correct detection of a mine, and the probability of false alarm, are important performance metrics for any sensor and any processing algorithm. The probability of detection is important for obvious reasons; however the probability of false alarm is also of major importance for simple reasons of cost. The number of false alarms is bound to be significantly greater than the number of mines found in a given area. Hence the cost, and the closely related duration, of the search for mines may well be largely determined by the large number of false alarms which will lead to unnecessary and time consuming digging of soil in the minefield. Thus all sensors and algorithms need to address these important metrics.
There have been several studies of mine detection using statistical methods. In,' the author discusses the use of one and two dimensional scan statistics in minefield detection in the situation when uniform clutter is assumed to characterize the absence of minefields in the area inspected. In2 a method of thresholding the data, gathered by a 94 GHz Doppler Beam Sharpening radar, using an Ordered Statistic Constant False Alarm Rate (OS-CFAR) detection algorithm is proposed. The scatterable minefield detection algorithm given in3 utilizes the reported coordinates of minelike objects to detect significant linearity by computing a directional density around each target and selecting the highest density direction as the orientation of the supposed lines along which mines have been placed. A statistical parametric multispectral sensor performance model to support minefield detection studies, multispectral sensor design/performance trade-off studies, and target detection algorithm development is proposed in.4 The overall model incorporates four components: a mission flight model, a multispectral target and background signature model, a multispectral sensor model, and a multispectral target detection model. In5 an automatic target detection algorithm which exploits spectral signatures of mines is proposed. Key features of this approach include the ability to adapt to unknown or changing background statistics and the ability to operate with unknown spectral signatures. A novel anomaly screening algorithm described in6 makes use of a regression diagnostic associated with the fitting of Markov random field models. This regression diagnostic quantifies the extent to which a given neighborhood of pixels is atypical, relative to local background characteristics. In,' the general statistical properties of mine detection systems are discussed utilizing high (e.g. acoustic) returns in the presence of reverberation, modeled as a (background) random field. The specific application considered is to the detection of underwater mines. Extensions of the one dimensional theory of high level stochastic excursions are used to describe the occurences of high peaks of a two dimensional background reverberation field by a Poisson model. Interestingly enough, the cs-Technique we develop in this paper for eliminating false alarms uses a similar idea of using the neighborhood differences, rather than the magnitude of excursions, of the reflected energy. Other recent papers have also directly addressed the statistical characterization of minefield data'2 and the statistical modeling of minefields.'6'9 In other work, we have considered the use of minefield statistics to design search strategies which can be then used either to direct human or robotic search. '4"5 The minefield data we will use in this study includes measurements, provided by DARPA,8 with two different electromagnetic induction sensor systems, at a variety of geographic locations. This data has been collected in a series of systematic minefield sensing experiments which have been conducted at multiple locations with a variety of sensors, implanted with decoy mines and mine-like objects. The first sensing system considered is a Geonics Specifically, the data we will use represents the measurements collected in a roughly 100 x 100 square meter area for four different regions. In order to be consistent with data description, we will use the following names for these regions which will prove to have significantly different clutter characteristics, as well as different target (decoy mine) locations: they will refer to them as Firing Point (FP) 20, Firing Point (FP) 22, Seabee and Turkey Creek. An example of EMI energy data is shown on Figure 1 , for im Z Coil measurements obtained by DARPA. 8 The vertical lines simply indicate target locations and do not represent energy values. The area which appears to have zero energy is simply an area for which we do not have any data (e.g. it may just not have been surveyed). Inspection of the figure shows the significant amount of clutter in various areas, and the relatively low energy levels at target locations. One source of innacuracy in the practical use of the data we employ in this study is related to the exact location of the sensor being used as data was registered. This is due to a variety of instrumentation and data collection effects, leading to errors in registering the sensor's position as it travels continuously across the minefield. Hence, we have followed a commonly accepted procedure suggested for using this data, which is to register the mine locations by analyzing the energy levels near the approximate known mine locations. We assume that if there is a mine at a point then its immediate neighbors should have lower energies. To give an idea of this effect, two of the 5mx5m regions that we examine are shown in Figure 2 .
THE EFFECT OF "DECLARATION" ON FALSE ALARMS AND ROC CURVES
An established practice8"° in processing minefield data is the so called process of declaration which is based on the simple remark that whenever a false alarm or a mine is detected (i.e. whenever the sensor and detection algorithm says "alarm"), an area at and around the position at which the signal was detected is thoroughly searched. This search will typically involve visual inspection and perhaps digging with specialized tools and probes, but also often the use of other sensors. Thus when an alarm occurs, an area which includes that point is thoroughly checked out and all mines are found, or no mine found (i.e. it was a false alarm). It is convenient to simplify this area explored as being an h x h area centered at the point where the detection occurred (where h is in an appropriate unit, e.g. meters or half-meters, depending on the unit used for marking out the minefield). h is taken to be an odd integer, so that the center point of the area can be the location of detection. In practice the choice of h will depend on the search procedure being followed in the field, therefore it is of interest to determine how it affects the ROC curves for any given sensor or sensor suite. Thus several authors'°"2 present ROC curves for different sensors and processing algorithms, for a range of values of h varying between h = 1 (when the declaration procedure is simply not being used) to h = 3, 5, 7. Notice that a 49 m2 area may be considered to be excessive for a search around a presumed mine when the unit is in meters. However, when we are dealing with half meter grids for the minefield, an approximately 10 m2 search area corresponding to h = 7 might be quite reasonable.
Whenever a mine or a false alarm is located at some point p, the h x h set of points Ah (p) centered at pwill be considered to have been explored, and will be removed from further consideration concerning false alarm rates. By "point" p we mean some location p = (x, y) in the minefield, assuming that the whole field has been discretized in 1 x 1 unit squares, so that point (0, 0) would in fact refer to the square contained in the vertices (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) . Note that if some point q E Ah(p) has previously been included in the declaration area of some other point p' where a mine or false alarm has previously been detected, then q should not be eliminated twice from the areas being scanned. In general though it is of interest to have a theoretical understanding about how the procedure of declaration affects ROC curves. However he precise effect of h on the ROC curves is particularly difficult to determine theoretically, since it depends on the distribution of mines and of false alarms in the field, and especially on their proximity to each other. An exact computation of the effect of h would have to make assumptions about the spatial statistics of targets and false alarms, and would therefore be poor estimates for the results obtained with real data. Therefore in this section we derive robust bounds, which do not depend on statistical assumptions or on the nature of a particular minefield, for the impact that h will have on the probability of false alarm and the probability of correct detection.
In order to do so, let us first develop some notation. Consider a minefield in which the mine locations are denoted by the set T while the non-mine points where the detector may declare a false alarm (i.e. those points, for instance, where the energy response to a sensor is non-zero) are denoted by the set N. We write S = T U N, and TI, INI, 1s1 will be the sizes of the sets. Let Pj(h), Pd(h) be the probability of false alarm and the probability of correct detection, respectively, when a declaration area of size h x h is used. For h = 1, i.e. with no declaration, these will be denoted F1, Pd. Typically we will have N >> TI, i.e. we may have thousands of non-mine points in a minefield, with perhaps 10 or 20 mines. Ratios may be somewhat different if the targets sought are unexploded ordnance (UXO), but still the tNt would be much larger than TI. The following results are only valid for sensors or detectors which use point data, i.e. which base their decisions concerning the presence or absence of a mine or of a false alarm at a given point p, on sensor output (call it E(p)) at that single point p rather than at its surroundings or in other areas. This differs fom some of the algorithms which will be discussed later in this paper. Note that the following results refer to any given run of a detection algorithm on measured data on a specific minefield. Thus the probabilities P1(h), Pd(h) are simply the ratio of measured numbers:
where F(h) is the number of false alarms, and D(h) is the number of correct detections counted with a declaration area of h x h. All the following results concerning declaration (Propositions 1, 2, 3) assume that the false alarm rate P1 with h = 1 is homogeneous for all points p in the minefield data. Our first result is: Proposition 1. Consider a detector which only uses sensor data measured any point p to make decisions about that same point. Let P1(h) be the false alarm rate with an h x h declaration area. Then a lower bound for P1(h) for any (odd valued) h is given by:
In fact, because NI >> ITt, we recommend that the simpler inequality P1(h) 1+P1(h2-1) (1) be used, which has the added advantage of not requiring knowledge of Pd(h). In Figure 3 we compare the lower bound provided by (1) with empirical false alarm probabilities obtained with various values of h for a specific set of data from8 on the FP2O Site. We observe that the resulting ROC curves which use the lower bounds of P1(h) are, as one would expect, optimistic with respect to real data. An upper bound to the false alarm probabilities with declaration would also be quite useful. Notice that if the false alarm probability in the vicinity of a false alarm which has been discovered is different from P1 , say a value P1, which may occur for instance when false alarm are spatially highly correlated, then the lower bound formula (1) simply becomes:
Bounds for the Probability of Correct Detection
We can develop two different arguments concerning the detection probabilities Pd(h) with declaration:
. A) Pd(h) should be identical to Pd simply because with declaration, each detection and false alarm will lead to an individual point by point examination of the declaration area surrounding each detection or false alarm point p using the same sensor. Under this assumption, the number of targets correctly detected with or without declaration will be the same and Pd(h) = Pd.
. B) The detection probabilities with declaration will in fact be higher than without since the declarationarea will be searched more thoroughly after a detection or a false alarm with a greater detection probability Pd Pd.
The following result is obtained with this assumption. We will denote the corresponding probability of detection by Pd(h).
Proposition 2. Under Assumption B above, the probability of correct detection increases with declaration, provided that a more thorough detection procedure with higher probability of correct detection Pd Pd S used in the declaration area:
3. AN AREA BASED DETECTOR: THE &TECHNIQUE False alarms are the major source of needless time expenditure in the search for mines. Thus significant reductions of false alarm rates are very valuable. In this section we will propose and evaluate a method that significantly reduces false alarm rates by making use of neighborhood or area information around each point visited during the search. Consider again the energy measurements around two mine locations shown in Figure 2 , where we see that the energy at the mine location is higher than that at neighboring points. If this is generally true of most mine locations, and if this property were much less frequent in non-target areas, we would hold a very good lead into a manner of reducing false alarms. In order to see whether such an idea can be fruitfully pursued we examine the following statistic of the Z -cüil data from all of the measured sites with the electromagnetic induction (EMI) sensors: 
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Dn.E(P)-E(Pn))/ E(P) From these histograms we always notice an accumulation point close to the value D(p) = 1, which corresponds to the case where the neighboring points to point p exhibit very small relative energy. Other than that, we notice a very marked difference between histograms at mine locations, compared to histograms at other points: at mine locations most of the neighboring energy values are smaller than at p so that D(p) is positive most of the time. However at non-mine locations the distribution of energies is quasi equal on either side of the energy value at p.
These observations provide us with a simple but very useful improvement on the energy detector which we shall call the 8-Technique, where 6 is used to denote "difference":
. For any selected threshold energy level 0 select all data points p where the Z -coil EMI energy E(p) 0; call this set H(8).
. Select a number m = 1, . .., 8. For each p in H(9) count the number of immediate neighbors P whose energy value is strictly less than E(p), call it M(p). Notice that M(p) 8. If M(p) m classify p as a mine, otherwise treat it as a non-mine. Clearly many p's thus classified as mines will turn out to be false alarms. S We will say that ö = m/8, and in practice for many of our numerical examples we have selected = 7/8, or 8/8
because of the very significant clutter rejection capabilities of these parameter settings as shown in Figure 5 .
The effect of the ö-Technique on false alarms is illustrated in Figure 5 as a function of the energy threshold (9 of the detector. As the actual value of 5 increases, the percentage of false alarms rejected will vary from a low value of 10% to a high value of 85%. Thus the 5-Technique will significantly impact the ROC curves of an energy detector by reducing the false alarm rates. Figure 6 shows the ratio of false alarm probabilities P(h)/P1(h) for the two extreme cases h = 1 (no declaration) and h = 7 at the FP 20 Site as a function of the energy threshold 0. The significant reduction in false alarm probabilities is present even with a very large declaration area. We observe the same effect on all the other sites, but do not report all of the curves in this paper because of space limitations. The ROC curves in Figures 7-8 summarize the effect of the ö-Technique with ö = 8/8 as compared to the simple energy detector for im and O.5mZ Coil data from the FP 20 Site. In these figures the indicator "Theta" is used for the pure energy detector. Very significant performance improvements are evident without declaration, while as h increases, the gain introduced by the delta technique is reduced. Further detailed evaluations of the delta technique are presented in Figure 9 where, rather than tracing ROC curves for each different value of h, we have plotted the relative quality of the 5-Technique with respect to the energy detector. The measure we use in these plots is the Delta Improvement Ratio:
Here R(h) and R9(h) are the ratio of detection to the false alarm probability, with declaration h, as a function of the energy threshold 0, with and without the ö-Technique, respectively:
R(h) = (6) J.n Figure 9 we present in a compact form the Delta Improvement Ratio Q(h) for im Z coil data from FP 20 site as a function of the threshold of the energy detector 9 and of the declaration h. Only threshold values for which the probability of correct detection exceeds 0.8 are considered to avoid presenting irrelevant data. We see that even for declaration areas of 7m x 7mn improvements are significant. For smaller values of h (1, 3, 5 meters) the improvements obtained by the ö-Technique are indeed very significant.
Effect of Declaration on the &.Technique
The bounds and approximations we previously derived, which describe the effect that declaration of an h x h area will have on the ROC curves, assume that decisions concerning a point are based only on the statistics at that point. However we have just described a new detection algorithm which makes use of the shape of the energy curve at each point and in an area surrounding that point. Therefore it is of interested to evaluate the impact of declaration in this case.
Consider an algorithm which bases its decisions concerning target detection at some point p based on the fact that the energy levels in the L x iX square centered at p are strictly lower than the energy level at p; clearly in general needs to be an odd integer. In the results presented above for the ö-Technique we have used L\ = 3. First consider h L; notice that h < is of no practical interest. Again proceeding by means of the total number of false alarms with declaration, assuming that false alarm rates are uniformly the same across the minefield (including around any detected false alarm), and using the 5 -Technique we have:
where P(h) is the probability of false alarm of the 5-Technique with declaration, P is the corresponding probability without declaration, and the inequality expresses the fact that since each of the points in the Zx L sized area around each false alarm at point p have lower energy than p they will not in any case (with or without declaration) be considered candidates for false alarm. Thus the saving of number of false alarms around each point p cannot exceed (h2 -2) This immediately leads to: Proposition 3. A lower bound for the effect of declaration on the false alarm probability for the 5 -Technique is given by:
Notice that if false alarm rates around detected false aiarms are different (e.g. because of area based correlations) from the average false alarm rate across the minefield, then we can use the following inequality: P5 P(h) > .______________ -: [+P(h2-z2) where is the false alarm rate in the immediate vicinity of a false alarm which has been discovered with the area based detection technique.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have considered two methods for reducing false alarm rates in the detection of mines. These methods are also useful in the search for unexploded ordnance. They are based on the use of measured electromagnetic induction energy at and around targets.
The first method we have considered is "declaration" which is used to recognize that neighborhoods of false alarms or of detected mines should not be considered as contributing further false alarms, since they will be thoroughly examined in the process of search. A declaration area is considered to be an h x h unit area centered around the location of the target or of the false alarm.8"° We derive a lower bound for false alarm probabilities as a function of h and also discuss the impact on the probability of correct detection of targets.
Secondly we have considered the statistical distribution of energy in the immediate neighborhood of targets and of false alarms from calibrated data. The observation of specific characteristics of the difference in energy levels in the neighborhood of the two populations has led us to propose the "5-Technique" . This new method reduces considerably the false alarm rate by filtering out poential false alarm locations whose neighbors' measured energy levels do not have the characteristics of target neighborhoods. The reduction obtained in false alarm rates, and the improvements in ROC curves, with the ö-Technique are illustrated in this paper with numerous empirical results using data which has been made available through DARPA.8
Future work will fuse the approaches examined in this paper with techniques using other sensors (such as Ground Penetrating Radar and Infrared), and techniques using statistical decision theory.'2 It will be of great interest to see how the ö-Technique can perform with other sensory data such as Ground Penetrating Radar and Infrared. We will also make use of the statistical data and ROC curves obtained in this paper to design efficient search strategies using techniques similar to the ones we have developed in.14
